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Abstract 
This paper contributes to current debates on the politicization of international politics by 
examining party-political contestation of peace and security missions. It is guided by two 
interrelated questions, a) to what extent deployment decisions are contested amongst political 
parties and b) what drives such contestation. We examine data from a new dataset on 
parliamentary votes on deployment decisions in France, Germany, Spain and the UK and from 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Against conventional wisdom and in an effort to address the 
often-overlooked role of political parties, we find that military deployments have been 
systematically contested amongst political parties across Europe. Further, we find that 
contestation is driven by the left/right axis, as opposed to newer cleavages captured here by the 
so-called gal/tan axis. We also find evidence that patterns of contestation depend on parties’ 
position in government or opposition, a factor we relate to bureaucratic and international 
pressures on the parties in office, and to political opportunities for opposition parties.  
 
Key words: party politics, military missions, contestation, politicization, defence policy 
 
1 Introduction 
Scholars of international relations have highlighted the growing politicization of international 
politics (Zürn 2014). Proponents of the politicization thesis have argued that, with the furthering 
globalization, international institutions’ policies and procedures have ‘become salient and 
controversial on the level of mass politics’ (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014: 1275). Beyond assessing the 
extent of the domestic and transnational politicization of international norms and institutions, 
research has concentrated on identifying the drivers behind this contestation, in particular, the 
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relevance of classical ideological cleavages related to economic redistribution compared to new 
cleavages emerging as a consequence of globalization. These cleavages have been variously 
characterised as integration vs. demarcation (Kriesi et al., 2008; Grande and Kriesi, 2015), 
communitarian vs. cosmopolitan (Zürn, 2014; Zürn and de Wilde, 2016), libertarian vs. 
traditionalist (Bornschier, 2010), or green/alternative/libertarian vs. 
traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (gal/tan) (Hooghe et al., 2002). This has been best 
documented in relation to European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2017; Hutter et al., 2016; de 
Wilde et al., 2016) and areas of global governance such as trade, development, environment and 
public health (cf. Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2013), but less so in the area of international 
security, in particular the use of armed forces in the context of international security operations.  
 
However, as critically shown by episodes such as the Iraq war in 2003, decisions on military 
deployments can also become salient issues in domestic elections, polarize political elites and 
trigger both domestic and transnational social mobilization (cf. Chan and Safran, 2006; Danchev 
and Macmillan, 2005; Kaarbo and Cantir, 2013; Miyagi, 2009; Schuster and Maier, 2006). Since 
the Iraq war, parliamentary votes on troop deployments in Europe have also become more 
common, with a growing number of countries having strengthened the rights of parliaments in 
the authorization of military operations (anonymized self-reference). The questioning of existing 
international military engagements has also figured prominently in the electoral programmes of 
some ascendant populist parties in Europe (Balfour et al., 2016). These examples suggest that a 
neglect of party-politics in matters of the use of force is unjustified.  
 
Although research on international security has long challenged the perspective that ‘politics 
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stops at the water’s edge’ and has recognised the significance of domestic politics to security 
policy (cf. Auerswald, 1999; Gourevitch, 2002; Hermann and Peacock, 1987; Levy, 1986; 
Rosenau, 1966), little attention has been paid to ideological dimensions and to political parties 
specifically.1 Likewise, comparative politics’ work on political parties rarely includes foreign 
and security policy as a relevant dimension of party politics (cf. Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015: 
525-526). In this paper though, we bring together insights from research on politicization, 
foreign policy analysis, and comparative politics to examine the party-political contestation of 
peace and security missions at the core of international security politics. We challenge the 
conventional wisdom, still extant in both international relations and comparative politics 
disciplines, that security issues generate cross-party consensus and we directly examine the role 
of party ideologies and party politics.  
 
Going beyond single case studies, this paper addresses two inter-related questions: a) to what 
extent deployment decisions are systematically contested amongst political parties, i.e. whether 
supporters and opponents cluster predictably in the political space and b) what motivates and 
drives such contestation. We explore two types of data on party positioning on military missions 
by European democracies. First, we utilise experts’ estimates of political parties’ positions on 
peace and security missions in 31 European countries from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES) to map parties and party families on both a standard left vs. right spectrum and the ‘new 
politics’ gal vs. tan dimension. Second, presenting the new Parliamentary Deployment Votes 
Database (anonymized self-reference), we examine parliamentary votes on deployment 
decisions in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Whereas the CHES data come 
                                                
1 A notable exception is Rathbun (2004) and some more recent research cited later in this paper, though mostly 
focusing on single case studies. 
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with the advantage of covering a large number of countries, the voting data provide us with 
further insights into the degree and nature of contestation between and within political parties.    
 
The paper proceeds in five steps. Section 2 sets the theoretical parameters of the analysis by 
elaborating on why we might expect party-political differences over the use of military force – a 
question often overlooked by mainstream theories in international relations, comparative politics, 
and by research on the domestic politics of security policy. Section 3 presents the data and 
methods in more detail. Special attention is given to the introduction of our new dataset on 
parliamentary deployment votes in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Section 4 
shows the results of our empirical analyses. We first report to what extent deployment decisions 
are contested amongst political parties using both CHES data and an Agreement Index, adapted 
from studies on the European Parliament, to compare the degree of contestation of military 
deployments with other policy areas (section 4.1). We then investigate the drivers of party 
contestation over security missions, looking both at the effect of ideological cleavages and of 
parties’ position in government and opposition (section 4.2). Section 5 concludes by 
summarizing the findings and discussing the implications for current debates on the politicization 
of international politics.  
 
 
2 Party-political contestation of military missions 
Traditionally, neither students of international relations nor their colleagues in comparative 
politics expect a great deal of party-political contestation over foreign policy, particularly 
security policy. International Relations scholars historically treated states as unitary actors and 
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tended to examine national interests and national identity rather than competing party-political 
visions over foreign policy. Neorealists, for example, expect states to rationally unify in response 
to the imperatives of anarchy. Constructivists, in turn, tend to focus on international norms and 
logics of appropriateness, operating at the systemic level, with norms internalised by the state as 
a whole. Even constructivists who look inside the state at identities, roles, and ontological 
security also tend to assume a unified state as the key actor (cf. Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016: 3-9).  
Liberalism either remains at the system level (neoliberalism) or places the focus on public 
opinion and democratic institutions (democratic peace). Even if parties do have underlying 
differences on matters of security, scholarship on international conflict has often assumed that 
these differences might be suppressed in the face of external threats (Huddy, 2013; Levine and 
Campbell, 1972; Simmel, 1955). International crises bring about, at least temporarily, a rally 
around the flag-effect (Waltz, 1967: 273; Oneal et al., 1996) that unites domestic political actors 
and makes criticism of the government look inappropriate. According to the Copenhagen School, 
when elites securitize issues – i.e. framing them as a matter of security –, they take them beyond 
normal politics and out of bounds for party contestation (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). Taken together, 
the idea that politics stops at the water’s edge suggests that dissent on deployment decisions is 
rather unlikely as such votes may transcend party politics and demonstrate national unity instead. 
 
Although theories of international relations are increasingly incorporating domestic political 
factors (Kaarbo 2015), and Foreign Policy Analysis has, for decades, focused on the domestic 
politics of international relations, there has been very little attention to parties as ideational and 
political agents in security policy.  Within the study of comparative politics, in turn, scholars 
emphasize that the emergence of political parties is best understood as a response to domestic 
 
 
7 
conflict (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Conflicts over foreign and security politics do not figure 
prominently in explanations of party systems, which have emphasized economic, cultural and 
religious cleavages (Boix, 2007: 513). The few studies that focus on the role of political parties 
in politicizing international governance have also concentrated on economic and cultural issues, 
most notably trade and migration (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014). When addressed, contestation on 
security issues is more often related to the phenomenon of transnational politicization, for 
example the emergence of anti-war (global) protest movements, rather than its role in the 
domestic political and electoral spheres (cf. Lichbach and de Vries, 2007). Overall, therefore, it 
is generally assumed that voters care more about party positions on other issues, particularly 
domestic policy and economic pocket-book issues, and thus have little motivation to distinguish 
themselves in security policy.  
 
More recently, however, research on foreign policy has suggested that foreign and security 
policy is indeed an important area of disagreement among political parties (see, for example, 
Bjereld and Demker, 2000; Calossi et al., 2013; Clare, 2014; Chryssogelos, 2017; Devine, 2009; 
Hofmann 2017; Kaarbo 2012; Özkececi-Taner, 2005; Pijovic, 2016; Schuster and Maier, 2006; 
Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015). Because foreign policy, including military missions, can be salient 
to voters and influence voting behaviour (cf. Aldrich et al., 2006; Clements, 2013; Gartner and 
Segura, 2008), political parties have incentives to court public opinion and distinguish 
themselves from one another on security issues (cf. Bow and Black, 2008; Clare 2010; 
Hildebrandt et al., 2013; Joly and Dandoy, 2016; Mello, 2012; Rathbun 2004). Much of the 
previous research, however, has focused on single countries or episodes, or on the relationship 
between ideological factionalism and international conflict. There is yet no comparative analysis 
 
 
8 
of the extent to which parties systematically differ on military operations across countries. This 
paper addresses this gap by examining the following proposition: 
 
P1: Decisions on the deployment of armed forces are systematically contested amongst the 
political parties in a country. 
 
A full exploration of the topic, however, requires going beyond the parties matter-argument to 
examine motivations behind parties’ orientations towards military deployments. We are 
particularly interested in the extent contestation of military missions corresponds to general 
cleavages that have been identified by scholars of party politics and recent studies on 
politicization of international affairs (see below). The most prominent of such cleavages is, of 
course, the left/right one that emerged during the industrial revolution and remains highly 
influential to the present day (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Koch and Sullivan (2010) argue, for 
example, that positions on the use of armed force abroad result from positions on social policy 
because the armed forces and the welfare state compete for the same resources. Therefore, 
political parties that promote the welfare state tend to oppose large armies, expensive military 
procurement as well as the actual use of armed force abroad. Studies on the actual use of force 
find support for a left/right cleavage as ‘right governments are more likely to be involved in 
militarized disputes than are left governments’ (Palmer et al., 2004: 13; see also Arena and 
Palmer, 2009; Clare, 2010, 2014; Oktay, 2014; Rathbun, 2004; Williams, 2014).  
 
Changing values in society, globalization, migration and the emergence of supranational 
authority have led students of party politics to consider additional cleavages that pit winners of 
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globalization against losers (Kriesi et al., 2008) and/or proponents of post-materialist and 
cosmopolitan values against traditionalists and communitarians (Hooghe and Marks, 2017; Zürn 
and de Wilde, 2016). The relevance of this cleavage has been established more broadly for 
parties’ positions on European integration and globalization but has not been examined for 
military missions. Because military missions of the post-Cold War period are no longer about 
territorial defence and are more often justified as ‘saving strangers’ (Wheeler, 2000) from state-
sponsored violence and repression, the use of armed force may resonate with cosmopolitan 
values of human security and equality (Rathbun, 2004).   
 
Taken together, we derive two propositions from the literature on party-political cleavages: 
 
P2: Party-political contestation of military missions is structured by a left/right cleavage 
with right parties more supportive of such missions than left parties. 
 
P3: Party-political contestation of military missions is structured by a post-
materialist/cosmopolitan vs. traditionalist/nationalist cleavage with parties scoring high on 
post-materialism/cosmopolitanism being more supportive of such missions than parties 
scoring high on traditionalism/nationalism. 
 
Although the left/right as well as the post-materialism/traditionalism cleavage can easily be 
applied to military missions, students of the partisan theory of public policy (as well as structural 
theories of international relations) have argued that for security and defence policy, the 
ideological disposition of governments may be superseded by pressures emanating from the 
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international system. Hans Keman, for example, argued that geopolitical factors are particularly 
important for defence spending and render domestic politics by and large irrelevant (Keman, 
1982: 192). Even though the end of the Cold War might have created more room for political 
manoeuvre when it comes to wars of choice, ‘systemic pressures to cooperate’ (Kreps 2010: 192) 
remain high. Sarah Kreps argues that in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, political parties chose 
to forgo electoral gains because they were sensitive to the high reputational costs of defection 
from a joint intervention (see also Schultz, 2001). In addition, high levels of path dependency 
and bureaucratic routines make any substantial policy changes to on-going and inherited force 
commitments very difficult (Goldmann, 1982; Hermann, 1990). However, in contrast to Kreps, 
who sees not only governing parties but elites in general under pressure to contribute to joint 
interventions, we argue that such pressures are primarily felt in government and thus expect 
political parties in government to factor them into the positions they take, whereas parties in 
opposition remain less constrained from such considerations. This logic is consistent with Lewis’ 
(2017) claim that when in power, political parties tend to become more internationalist and 
interventionist. Moreover, parties in opposition have a general incentive to present themselves as 
an alternative to the ones in government and thus to oppose government policies, even on 
deployment decisions. According to Williams (2014: 112-113), if opposition parties perceive a 
military mission ‘as being unpopular or potentially disastrous, then they will publicly oppose 
using force’ (see also Schultz, 2001). This leads us to our fourth proposition: 
 
P4: In government, political parties are, ceteris paribus, more supportive of military 
missions than in opposition. 
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It should be noted, however, that any test of this proposition may be subject to a selection 
effect, as the agenda-control is by and large in the hands of the government.2 In other words, 
although governments frequently ‘inherit’ troop deployments from their predecessors, they 
still have some room of manoeuver to adjust troop size, mandate, rules of engagement and 
caveats to the prevailing mood in parliament. Therefore, while our data show that backbench 
opposition is not uncommon, especially in the UK, we do not expect this proposition to be 
falsified. Nevertheless, taking parties’ position in government or opposition into account will 
act as an important control for testing our other propositions in the multivariate regression 
below.  
 
 
3 Methodology 
To examine the party-political contestation of military missions, we use expert survey data on 
political parties’ positions as well as data from a new dataset on parliamentary votes on 
deployment decisions. The expert survey data come from the two latest rounds of the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey in 2010 and 2014, which included a question on peace and security missions 
(Bakker et al., 2015). Under the heading ‘position towards international security and peace 
keeping missions’, experts are asked to determine a political party’s position on a scale from 0 
(‘strongly favours COUNTRY troop deployment’) to 10 (‘strongly opposes COUNTRY troop 
deployment’).3  More than 300 experts mapped the positions of political parties.4  
                                                
2 We owe this point to one of the anonymous reviewers. 
3 For this article, we have reversed the scale and re-coded the ‘international security’ variable into a support_mission 
variable that ranges from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly favours). 
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As in the previous survey, experts were also asked to map political parties’ position on a 
left/right and a gal/tan axis: Experts are asked ‘Please tick the box that best describes each party's 
overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right)’. On gal/tan, 
experts are asked: ‘Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and 
rights. Libertarian or post-materialist parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, 
access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. 
Traditional or authoritarian parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and 
stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural 
issues.’ (Bakker et al., 2015: 144). 0 indicates extreme gal and 10 extreme tan.5  
Finally, we make use of the notion of party families to cluster parties into groups with 
shared core values and interests and to examine whether there are significant differences across 
the main party families. Data on family membership come from CHES. We exclude the 
Confessional/Protestant, Agrarian and Regionalist/Ethnic party families as well as all parties that 
are coded as not belonging to any family. Furthermore, we merged the party families 
Conservatives and Christian Democrats into one category because they occupy comparable 
positions in the countries we studied in depth. We thus explore differences between the main 
party families, namely Conservatives/Christian Democrats (criscon), Socialists, Liberals, 
Greens, Radical Left and Radical Right.  
                                                                                                                                                       
4 The 2010 survey covers 237 parties in 28 states, namely all EU states except Cyprus, Luxemburg and Malta as 
well as Croatia, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. The 2014 survey covers 268 parties, including those from Cyprus, 
Luxemburg and Malta (see Bakker et al., 2015). 
5 For a detailed discussion of the survey’s validity and reliability see Hooghe et al. (2010). 
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The merits and shortcomings of expert survey data in comparison to the data of the 
manifesto research group (Volkens et al., 2013) have been extensively discussed.6 Our decision 
to use the CHES expert survey data does not result from taking sides in this dispute but is 
motivated by the data’s validity for the purpose of this paper: whereas the CHES data 
specifically include a question about ‘peace and security missions’, the manifesto data handle the 
rather broad categories ‘military: positive’, ‘military: negative’ and ‘peace: positive’; 
additionally, manifesto coders are instructed to interpret ‘military’ to include defence spending, 
force levels, rearmament and treaty obligation. Thus, for our purposes, we consider the CHES 
question to capture this study’s attempt at measuring party-political contestation over military 
missions more precisely. 
For the deployment votes, we compiled a new database, Parliamentary Deployment 
Votes (anonymized self-reference), in which we collected data on a total of 183 roll-call votes7 in 
plenaries for the period between 1991 and August 2016 in France, Germany, Spain and the 
United Kingdom.8 These four countries have played important roles in military missions but 
represent different constitutional traditions and political-strategic cultures. Together, these four 
                                                
6 See the contributions to the special symposium ‘Comparing Measures of Party Positioning: Expert, Manifesto, and 
Survey Data’ in Electoral Studies 2007 as well as Gemenis (2013). One of the common criticisms on the use of 
expert survey data is that there is a risk of endogeneity, since experts might factor a party’s position on military 
missions into their assessment of its position on the left/right and gal/tan dimension and vice versa. However, we 
consider this risk to be limited because experts of the Chapel Hill survey are typically from comparative politics 
with a prime interest in economic policy and the welfare state, rather than foreign policy. Their left/right and gal/tan 
assessment is thus likely to be informed primarily from domestic political issues. 
7 Strictly speaking, the votes we study are not roll-call votes because individual MPs are not called to indicate their 
vote (as practiced in the US Congress). Instead, individual MPs’ votes are usually recorded electronically or by way 
of voting cards (for an overview see Saalfeld, 1995).  
8 All voting data can be retrieved from www.deploymentvotewatch.eu . An overview can be found in the appendix 
to this paper. 
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countries account for approximately two thirds of defence spending in the EU. Across the four 
countries under study, the practice of voting on military missions differs enormously 
(anonymized self-reference). The German Bundestag has ex ante approval rights for military 
missions due to a Federal Constitutional Court ruling in 1994 and has voted more than 140 times 
since, partly because extensions, changes in mandate or troop levels require parliamentary 
approval. The French parliament was only endowed with ex post voting rights on military 
operations through the constitutional reform of 2008 (anonymized self-reference). In Spain, 
parliamentary control of military missions had become an issue in the wake of the 1999 Kosovo 
intervention, but it was only after the highly contested involvement of Spain in the 2003 Iraq war 
that an ex ante veto power was introduced, by means of an Organic Law, in 2005. In the UK, 
deployment votes are rare because of former royal prerogatives but have become more common 
in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War and have even led some to see this as a new convention (Mello, 
2017; Strong, 2014).9 To make deployment vote data comparable across parties and reflect the 
interest in government-opposition dynamics, we calculate averages of no-votes per party during 
a given legislative term (the full dataset contains disaggregated and aggregated data on every 
single vote).10 Our coding of party families is based on the CHES coding. 
                                                
9 The record of parliamentary involvement is, however, inconsistent, even in recent years. The 2010 vote to continue 
deployments in Afghanistan, for example, occurred nine years after the introduction of British troops there. The 
2011 vote on the use of force against Libya was post-hoc, after the mission had begun, and in 2013, the UK 
government deployed military assets and military personnel (in non-combat roles) to Mali without a parliamentary 
vote. 
 
10 In the subsequent analyses, we exclude one vote in the Bundestag, which was about Germany’s contribution to 
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan and at the same time a vote of confidence for Chancellor Schröder 
and his coalition of Social Democrats and Greens. The data clearly demonstrate that MPs’ voting behaviour was 
driven by the confidence vote, not the simultaneous question of sending troops to Afghanistan. Although the 
CDU/CSU and the FDP supported the mission, not a single MP from these parties in the opposition voted in favour 
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The data on deployment votes also allows us to investigate the extent of party-political 
contestation of deployment decisions as compared to other matters. To capture the degree of 
dissent within parliament as a whole, we calculate an agreement index (AI) that Hix et al. (2005) 
originally developed to measure party cohesion in the European Parliament.11 The AI equals 1 
when all MPs vote together and it equals 0 when they are equally divided between the voting 
options. This index has become an established measure to assess the unity of groups within 
legislatures – mostly political parties –, but in studies of the European Parliament also members 
of the same country. To our knowledge, the AI has not been used to measure degrees of 
consensus within a parliament as a whole,12 most likely because the recording of individual votes 
already is a sign of contestation; uncontroversial parliamentary decisions are often adopted 
without the time-consuming recording of individual votes. Moreover, parliaments differ 
enormously in the ways they vote, with some often recording votes and others doing so only 
rarely (Saalfeld, 1995). Hence, recorded votes may be a very unrepresentative sample of all votes 
in a parliament (Carruba et al., 2008).  Yet for the purposes of this study, the AI allows an 
assessment of the degree of dissent on military mission votes and on any other matters in our 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the government motion. With 326 votes against and 336 in favour, it was the closest deployment vote in the 
Bundestag thus far. 
11 The precise formula is: 
       
12 Students of the US Congress typically measure bipartisanship as ‘the extent to which majorities or near majorities 
of both parties in Congress vote together’ (Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007: 11). The Agreement Index, however, is a 
much more precise measure of dissent. Hix et al. calculated an AI for the entire EP only in order to better gauge the 
relative unity of political parties and national delegations. 
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four countries. This allows us to examine to what extent party politics indeed stops at the water’s 
edge.13 
A final note of caution applies to both data sources: Neither the CHES nor the 
deployment vote data distinguish between different types of missions. Such differentiation would 
be particularly welcome for testing our third proposition on the impact of a party’s gal/tan 
position because we can safely assume that humanitarian missions are more appealing to parties 
at the gal-end of the spectrum than counter-terrorism missions, whereas the opposite applies to 
parties at the tan-end of the spectrum. Except for a few ideal-typical cases, however, military 
interventions are notoriously difficult to categorize. Governments typically evoke a combination 
of justifications for a military intervention, often blending humanitarian motivations with self-
defence (as was the case in the 2003 Iraq war and the 2014 strikes against Daesh) to appeal to 
various segments of society. The relative weight of these justifications is often at the center of 
the party-political debates that we study in this paper. Any classification of military interventions 
would therefore also be in tension with our point of departure that foreign and security policy is 
politically contested.  For the purpose of this paper then, we explore party positions on military 
missions in general. 
 
                                                
13 For the calculation of the Agreement index for recorded votes on other business, data on Germany and on France 
are taken from the homepages of the Bundestag 
(https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/datenhandbuch/datenhandbuch_archiv, last accessed 14 July 2016) and the 
Assemblée nationale (http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/scrutins/liste/%28legislature%29/14, last accessed 
September 2016), data on the UK from Firth and Spirling (2003) and from publicwhip 
(http://www.publicwhip.org.uk; last accessed September 2016). Because voting data for the Spanish Congreso had 
to be imputed manually, we decided to limit our sample to votes on adopted legislative acts and to exclude votes on 
amendments and non-legislative business. The data were retrieved from 
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Iniciativas/LeyesAprob, last accessed 16 September 
2016).  
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4 Findings 
4.1 Degree of contestation: Does politics stop at the water’s edge?   
Table 1 contains our calculation of the Agreement Index. It shows the average degree of 
contestation of military missions compared to other business for every legislative term under 
study. Two findings are worth highlighting: first, degrees of contestation vary significantly 
across countries and legislative terms. They range, for instance, from high contestation on 
military missions with an AI equalling 0,46 for the Cameron II government in the UK to low 
contestation with an AI equalling 0,98 for the Zapatero II government in Spain. This means that 
military missions are neither uncontroversial nor highly contested as such. For France, 
contestation moves between AIs of 0,66 (Sarkozy presidency) and 0,94 during François 
Hollande’s term. Germany gives testament to a similar spread with AIs ranging from 0,62 
(highest contestation) to 0,95 (lowest). Whereas in Spain, decisions are highly consensual and 
the number of no-votes of the right-wing PP and the left PSOE are negligible, in the UK, 
deployment votes have been much more controversial. The second finding is that levels of 
contestation of military missions in all four countries are clearly lower than those for other 
legislative business. In the Zapatero II government in Spain cited above, the AI for other 
business equals 0,68, a considerable difference of 0,3 with the military mission AI. In France 
during Hollande’s term (2012-2017), the difference between mission-AI (0,94) and other 
business-AI (0,54) is even larger, reflecting the majority’s split on many policy issues with its 
own president, compared to high multi-partisan support for military missions.14 The only 
                                                
14 The little degree of contestation during President Hollande’s term also reflects the 2015 terrorist attacks in France 
and its (positive) impact on national unity. These attacks increased support for the broad-scale military action 
against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, facing an all-party minimum of no-votes of .76 per cent. The other two missions 
extended in parliament during Hollande’s term were the anti-terror mission in Mali and the stabilization force for the 
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exception to this finding is the Cameron II cabinet. The average Agreement Index in this case, 
however, is based on a single vote (on using force against Daesh). In general, though, the 
Agreement Index shows that politics may not stop at the water’s edge but it tends to become less 
contested.  
 
[table 1 about here] 
 
While the Agreement Index demonstrates that deployment decisions are indeed contested, it does 
not provide any additional information of where dissent originates. For a better understanding of 
the pattern of contestation of military missions, we thus examine whether political parties 
systematically disagree about deployments. We first use the CHES data on parties’ support for 
military missions.15 
 
[figure 1 about here] 
 
[table 2 about here] 
 
As figure 1 visualizes, and as the ANOVA analysis in table 2 demonstrates, party families 
systematically differ in the degree to which they favour their country’s participation in peace and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Central African Republic, countries traditionally central to French African policies, and both passed without a single 
no-vote.  
15 Data on party families are made available in the ‘trendfiles’ (Polk et al. 2017; Bakker et al. 2015), which, in 
contrast to the data used for figures 1 and 2, exclude political parties from Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. In 
addition, political parties from Cyprus, Luxemburg and Malta are missing for 2010. To maximize comparability, we 
manually excluded them for 2014 as well.  
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security missions, as stated in proposition 1. As a comparison of the standard deviations shows, 
differences within most party families increased, thus pointing to higher levels of contestation. 
Green parties are more supportive than radical-left parties, and socialist parties are more 
supportive than green and radical-left ones. A notable exception is the French Parti radical de 
gauche (PRG), which CHES experts gauged as more supportive than the Greens. Support is 
highest amongst Liberals and Christian Democrats/ Conservatives, with some outliers in Central 
and Eastern European countries. The Radical Right is about as supportive as the Greens. 
Although the boxplot shows considerable variation within party families, the ANOVA analysis 
reported in table 2 demonstrates that differences between party families are statistically highly 
significant. The data also suggests that the gap between the Radical Left as the main party family 
most consistently opposing peace and security missions and the parties of the centre is widening, 
rather than narrowing.  
 
Our collection of deployment votes allows us to further examine whether a similar pattern of 
contestation can be observed in actual votes on military missions. Figure 2 visualizes the average 
share of no-votes during a legislative term across party families. Figure 2 supports our first 
proposition that the deployment of armed forces is systematically contested amongst political 
parties. The figure shows that differences across party families are even more pronounced in 
actual votes. The boxes and whiskers also indicate, however, that there is a considerable spread: 
radical-left, green and liberal parties have all voted both unanimously for and against military 
deployments throughout a particular legislature. Of course, whether a party is in government or 
in opposition impacts on its voting behaviour. In France, for example, radical-left PRG 
lawmakers are often part of left-wing majorities or part of the government and therefore vote in 
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line, contrary to the other parties in their family. In the UK, all Liberal MPs voted against the 
Iraq war in 2003 but most of them voted for interventions in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and 
Daesh in Iraq when in government.16 In Spain, the radical-left Izquierda Unida (IU) has never 
given its approval to any mission but has abstained at several occasions – mainly EU maritime 
surveillance and training operations and UN-led missions. IU’s choice for abstention (instead of 
voting directly against) was most frequent during the Zapatero II term, when Socialists held a 
minority government, thus often dependent on the votes of IU and other regional parties.17 In 
Germany, Social Democrats and Greens voted in favour of military missions when in 
government but were less supportive when in opposition. We will come back to the impact of 
being in government or opposition when running a multivariate regression analysis below. 
 
[figure 2 about here] 
 
Differences in support across party families are, however, by and large akin to those in figure 1: 
support is lowest among parties of the Radical Left, followed by Greens and Socialists. 
                                                
16 The 2013 vote on Syria was unusual in a number of other ways as well (Kaarbo and Kenealy, 2016). MPs actually 
voted on two motions – one supported by the Government (reflected in our data) and one introduced by Labour. 
There were only minor differences between the two motions; both called for a second vote before military action. 
The irony of the vote was that although most MPs supported the use of force (by voting for one motion or the other), 
since no motion gained majority support, UK participation in military strikes against Syria was taken off the table. 
This outcome was unprecedented as it was the first defeat for a British PM on a security matter since 1782, when 
Lord North, then PM, lost a vote of confidence following the British defeat at Yorktown. In 2014, the same 
parliament that was divided over Syria solidly supported force against Islamic State in Iraq, although here again, 
opposition did come from the left (some in Labour and the green MP). 
17 Regional left-wing parties represented in Congress (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego, Nafarroa Bai/Geroa Bai and Compromís) have also tended to vote against military operations or abstained, 
the latter option being also more frequent with Socialist governments.  
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Christian-Democrats and Conservatives as well as Liberals are generally supportive of military 
deployments with considerably decreasing shares of no-votes. Voting data differ from CHES 
data as regards the Radical Right: whereas the experts have gauged them to be unsupportive of 
peace and security missions, our voting data reveal that they never voted against any deployment 
decision. However, the empirical basis for this finding is very small: in the four countries under 
study, only two MPs of the Front national in the 2012-2017 legislature of the Assemblée 
nationale and a single UKIP MP in the 2015-17 House of Commons represent radical-right 
parties; additionally, these MPs took only part in a small number of votes. 
 
Taken together, expert survey and voting data demonstrate that military missions are contested 
among political parties. To be sure, the degree of dissent tends to be lower than for other, mostly 
domestic, issues, which suggests that the politics stops at the water’s edge idiom impacts on the 
politics of military deployments. By clustering political parties into families, we demonstrate, 
however, that political parties differ systematically on the use of force abroad: expert survey and 
voting data concur that Christian Democrats/Conservatives are more supportive than Socialists, 
who are in turn more supportive than Greens and the Radical Left. The two data sources only 
differ as regards the Radical Right: whereas experts find it almost as opposed to military 
missions as Greens, voting data suggest they are the most supportive of all parties. Because of 
their limited representation in parliament, however, the finding on the Radical Right is far from 
robust and will require further research in the future.  
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4.2 Drivers of contestation: old or new politics? 
Having demonstrated that military missions are politically contested, we now turn to the question 
of what motivates contestation. Specifically, we examine the three possible drivers discussed 
above, namely a party being either in government or opposition (proposition 4), its position on 
the left/right axis (proposition 2) and on the gal/tan axis (proposition 3).  
 
We begin by examining the impact of being in government or in opposition. Figure 3 
demonstrates that there is indeed strong evidence for our fourth proposition: membership in 
government has a statistically significant (p < 0,001) impact on the number of no-votes when 
parliament decides on military deployments: the average number of no-votes per party per 
legislature differs between 42,8% (in opposition) and 2,4% (in government).18 Outliers all come 
from the UK: In 2003, 84 out of 338 Labour MPs voted against their own government on the 
Iraq war. Whilst part of the Cameron/Clegg government, Liberal Democrats mostly voted with 
the government but the average number of no-votes increased: 10 out of 42 Liberal Democrats 
voting against their own government on a possible Syrian intervention in 2013. 
 
[figure 3 about here] 
 
To be sure, the enormous differences in voting against military missions might also result from a 
selection effect: Die Linke, for example, may vote against deployments because it is free to do so 
in opposition, but one can also argue that it is in opposition because it fundamentally opposes a 
key element of German security policy. Looking at political parties that move in and out 
                                                
18 This test includes lower chambers only and thus excludes the French Sénat. 
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government, however, suggests that voting behaviour is indeed partly driven by the constraints 
of being in office: The average share of no-votes amongst German Social Democrats and Greens 
dropped dramatically when in government (1998-2005) and rose again once back in opposition. 
In France, whereas 175 Socialists in the Assemblée nationale and 87 socialist senators voted 
against the Afghanistan mission extension in 2008 whilst in opposition, only one Socialist in the 
Assemblée nationale voted against Libya in 2011, and no socialist senator at all when the PS was 
in government. 
 
The CHES data on political parties’ left/right and gal/tan positions are particularly useful to 
examine whether contestation of military missions is driven by an overarching ideological 
cleavage, i.e. whether contestation reflects different fundamental values across the political 
spectrum. A previous study used data from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to 
demonstrate that party-political contestation over military missions follows a curvilinear 
left/right pattern (anonymized self-reference). The 2014 CHES data allow us to examine whether 
this finding holds for 2014 as well. Figure 4 demonstrates that it does, in line with our second 
proposition. In terms of the left/right cleavage, the correlation is indeed curvilinear: using a 
quadratic model, the correlation is statistically significant at the 0,001 level with a r2 of 0,36 
(2014).19 Support for peace and security missions increases as one moves from the left to the 
centre right and declines again towards the radical right. 
 
[figure 4 about here] 
 
                                                
19 A linear model is also statistically highly significant at the 0,001 level but the r2 is much lower (0,165 in 2014). 
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Figure 5 shows that support for military missions also differs along the gal/tan scale, as stated in 
our third proposition: Political parties that score high on being either green/alternative/libertarian 
or traditional/authoritarian/nationalist are both less supportive of deploying armed forces than 
those in the middle of this scale. The 2014 data in figure 5 demonstrate that the gal/tan scale is a 
highly significant predictor but explains less variation than the left/right scale (for 2014, r2 equals 
0,15). Compared to 2010, the differences in variation explained have declined (0,36/0,15 for 
2014 vs. 0,35/0,11 for 2010). Additional data from future surveys is needed to judge whether this 
is a significant trend. 
 
[figure 5 about here] 
 
Again, our voting data allow us to triangulate the drivers of political contestation. The actual 
deployment votes in our four countries confirm the importance of the left/right-cleavage. 
However, in contrast to the CHES data, the actual votes suggest a linear relationship with the 
Radical Right in France and the UK most supportive of military deployments. Figure 6 visualizes 
political parties’ positions on the left/right scale and their average share of no-votes in 
parliamentary deployment decisions. The scatterplot shows that the share of no-votes within a 
political party decreases as one moves from the (far) left to the (far) right of the political 
spectrum, again in line with our second proposition. Parties of the Radical Left, such as Die 
Linke in Germany and Izquierda Unida in Spain, sometimes voted unanimously against military 
deployments. The only time some MPs of Die Linke ever voted in favour of a military mission in 
Germany was when the Bundeswehr was called in to support the destruction of chemical 
weapons in Syria in 2014.  The Greens were the traditional home of the German peace 
 
 
25 
movement and initially shared the Radical Left’s principled opposition to military missions. 
Even though the Bundeswehr’s early deployments were non-combat missions, the Greens 
consistently voted against them during Helmut Kohl’s third government between 1990 and 1994. 
Starting after the 1994 elections, however, the Greens embarked on a painful process of 
recalibrating their position on the use of force (Vollmer, 1998). Spurred by future Foreign 
Minister Fischer, this process was highly conflictual but also signalled to the Social Democrats 
that a possible coalition would be feasible. When in government between 1998 and 2005, the 
share of no-votes dropped indeed but remained consistently above the share amongst Social 
Democrats. Back in opposition (from 2005 on), the share of no-votes rose again but not to the 
level of the pre-government period. A closer look shows that the Greens are especially divided 
over the Afghanistan missions. At the same time, their opposition against the Bundeswehr’s 
contribution to the EU-led maritime operation against human trafficking and their support for the 
missions in Darfur, South Sudan, Bosnia and Kosovo has been unanimous.  
 
 
[figure 6 about here] 
 
Figure 7 visualizes political parties’ positions on the gal/tan scale and their average share of no-
votes in parliamentary deployment decisions. The scatterplot demonstrates that the average share 
of no-votes decreases as one moves from the green/alternative/libertarian end of the spectrum to 
the traditional/authoritarian/nationalist end, as stated in our third proposition. A closer look 
shows that political parties’ positions on the gal/tan dimension often resemble those on the 
left/right axis: UKIP and the Front national mark the far end on both scales; on the other end of 
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the spectrum, radical-left and green parties switch positions but both remain in the left half of the 
spectrum. Yet, a curve estimation of the left-right and gal/tan models demonstrates that the 
correlation of the left-right model with support for deployments is far stronger than for the 
gal/tan model. In the linear model, 38% of the variation in voting is explained by left-right; in the 
cubic model, more than 50% of variation is explained. For gal/tan, only around 13% of the 
variance in support for missions is explained by the gal/tan scale (for gal/tan, linear and cubic 
models hardly differ). 
 
[figure 7 about here] 
 
The figures thus far provide evidence for both governmental constraints and ideological 
contestation. In order to gauge the relative predictive power of government/opposition, left/right 
and gal/tan, we run a multivariate regression analysis with the average share of no-votes as 
dependent variable. We test several models to assess the impact of these variables on their own 
and in combination with each other. Table 3 shows that a party’s left/right score has a strong and 
highly significant effect on a party’s average share of no-votes in a legislative term. The effect is 
strongest when controlling for both gov/opp and gal/tan but the effect is strong and statistically 
significant across different models. The predictive power of a party’s position on the gal/tan is 
smaller and melts away if left/right is controlled for. The effect of gov/opp is also strong but 
remains weaker than left/right. It is statistically highly significant in any combination with other 
predictors. Taken together, therefore, we can conclude that actual party behaviour in parliament 
is driven by both governmental constraints and ideological contestation, especially as connected 
to parties’ positions on the left/right scale. 
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[table 3 about here] 
 
5 Conclusion 
Decisions on the use of armed force are at the heart of security and defence policy, an issue area 
that has remained underexplored by students of party politics. Although deployment decisions 
have often been framed in terms of a national interest that transcends particular interests, our 
analysis shows that they are not exempted from party-political contestation: Political parties in 
Europe systematically disagree on whether their country should participate in peace and security 
missions. Moreover, in line with recent studies on politicization of European integration and 
international affairs, our analysis of the CHES data indicates that differences in support for 
military operations across parties are growing over time rather than narrowing.  
 
Whereas the CHES data provide us with expert judgments on parties’ general positions on 
military missions, our new Parliamentary Deployment Votes Database allows us to gain 
additional insights into how political parties act when asked to support an actual mission in 
parliament. Our analysis shows that being part of the governmental majority or of the opposition 
has a big impact on a party’s actual voting. However, the government/opposition logic is not the 
most important factor in explaining differences in voting behaviour. Instead, the strongest 
predictor of how supportive a political party is of actual military deployments is its position on 
the left/right axis: support is lowest amongst parties of the Radical Left and increases as one 
moves along the left/right axis to the Greens, the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the 
Christian Democrats and Conservatives.  
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The findings thus indicate that debates on the use of armed forces in Europe are still structured 
around the ‘old’ welfare-oriented cleavage, rather than a ‘new’ culturalist cleavage emerging in 
response to the twin dynamics of globalization and Europeanization. However, evidence for the 
positioning of parties on the Radical Right is still inconclusive. The CHES data suggest that they 
are less supportive of military missions than the parties of the centre and the moderate right. In 
contrast, deployment vote data suggest high levels of support but should be treated with great 
caution as they are derived from very few MPs and votes in just two countries. Whether support 
for peace and security missions relates to the left/right axis in a linear or curvilinear way 
therefore remains an item for further research. 
 
Another item for future research is the disaggregation of military missions. The CHES data 
inquire about peace and security missions in general and the deployment vote data report 
averages per legislative term, thus lumping together peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian 
intervention and self-defence. Our analysis demonstrates that this is not necessarily a problem 
because systematic party-political differences on peace and security missions in general clearly 
exist and are just as meaningful as differences over, e.g., European integration in general. 
Nevertheless, disaggregating deployments in terms of purpose, justification under international 
law, risks for troops, international organization in charge etc. is a promising way to gain 
additional insights into patterns and drivers of contestation of military missions.  
 
Overall, this study contributes to the long-standing tradition of research on the domestic politics 
of international conflict but follows new ways.  We demonstrate that the party system is an 
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important site of contestation as regards military missions, thus redressing the relative lack of 
research on parties as important actors in security policy.  Going beyond the parties matter-
claim, this study advances research on political parties and foreign policy by unpacking the 
different ideological dimensions as well as political incentives and logics driving parties’ 
positions and voting on military missions. This analysis not only bridges previous research from 
international relations on politicization, from comparative politics on political parties, and from 
foreign policy analysis on domestic politic processes, but our findings also connect perspectives 
on ideologies and ideas with more institutional approaches. Political parties, as carriers of 
ideologies housed in institutional-political contexts, are an ideal subject to examine these 
connections.   
 
[appendix about here] 
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Table 1: Agreement Indexes 
 
Country term 
Votes on military missions Other Votes  
Agreement 
Index  N 
Agreement 
Index  N 
France (only 
AN) 
Mitterrand 0,89 1 n.a. n.a. 
Sarkozy 0,66 2 0,51 694 
Hollande 0,94 4 0,54 1267 
Germany 
Kohl III 0,62 2 0,48 127 
Kohl IV 0,70 5 0,41 175 
Schröder I 0,86 15 0,53 147 
Schröder II 0,95 16 0,42 86 
Merkel I 0,78 32 0,69 144 
Merkel II 0,69 38 0,42 237 
Merkel III 0,77 40 0,71 114 
Spain 
Zapatero I 0,96 1 0,73 107 
Zapatero II 0,98 3 0,68 83 
Rajoy I 0,92 6 0,54 134 
UK 
Blair 0,6 1 0,55 1246 
Cameron I 0,76 4 0,5 1226 
Cameron II 0,46 1 0,48 319 
 
 
Table 2: ANOVA analysis of support for peace and security missions across party families 
 
Family  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Radical Right 2014 20 4,14 1,836 
2010 21 4,17 1,540 
Conservatives and 
Christian Democrats 
2014 51 6,07 1,592 
2010 43 6,23 1,078 
Liberal 2014 36 6,18 1,082 
2010 35 5,87 0,941 
Socialist 2014 35 5,34 1,422 
2010 29 5,21 1,324 
Green 2014 19 4,12 1,307 
2010 17 3,92 0,948 
Radical Left 2014 22 2,49 1,359 
2010 21 2,58 1,003 
p<0.00 between-group comparison for both 2010 and 2014 
 
 
39 
 
Table 3: Multivariate regression analysis 
 
	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	   	  Model	  5	  
Left/right	   -­‐0,619***	   	   -­‐0,592***	   	   -­‐0,803***	  
GAL/TAN	   	   -­‐0,358***	   	   -­‐0,366***	   0,268	  
Gov/Opp	   	   	   -­‐0,444***	   -­‐0,486***	   -­‐0,426***	  
	  
N=	  57;	  coefficients	  are	  standardized;	  ***	  =	  p	  <	  0,01;	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Table 4: Appendix. Roll-Call Votes in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom20  
 * = in government ** = temporally in government   *** = partially in government   
 
 
                                                
20 In this and in subsequent tables, the average share of no-votes is calculated by dividing the number of no-votes by 
the total number of votes from members of a particular political party. The total number of no-votes represents an 
average of no-votes over the whole legislature, calculated by dividing the number of no-votes by the number of 
overall separate votes on missions per legislature. 
21 Because of the different electoral cycles of the two French chambers, this table takes the presidencies of 
Mitterrand, Sarkozy and Hollande as a structuring device. 
22 For lack of more precise data, we counted the full group votes here. 
23 The FN has only two senators from the 2014 election round onwards. Thus, they only voted on the two anti-Daesh 
missions in Iraq and Syria. 
Country Term21 
ch
am
be
r 
N
o 
of
 v
ot
es
 
Shar
e of 
no 
votes 
(ave-
rage) 
AI Average ‘no’-votes per political party family: total number and share within 
party family  
Radical 
Left 
Greens Socialists Liberals Conservati
ves 
Radical 
Right 
to
ta
l 
sh
ar
e to
ta
l 
sh
ar
e to
ta
l 
sh
ar
e to
ta
l 
sh
ar
e to
ta
l 
sh
ar
e to
ta
l 
sh
ar
e 
France Mitterran
d22 
A 1 7,6% 0,89 26 100%*** not in parliament 7 2,59%* 4 3,1% *** 4 3,2 not in parliament 
France Sarkozy A 2 21,27% 0,66 15 66,4% 2,5 75% 88 48,7% 0 0%* 1 0,3%* not in parliament 
France Sarkozy S 7 10,83% 0,83 12,1 46,1% 2,5 50% 43,5 50% 0 0%* 0 0%* not in parliament 
France Hollande A 4 0,99% 0,94 0,25 2,3%*** 0 0%** 0,5 0,19%* 0 0% 3,25 2,09% 0 0% 
France Hollande S 4 0,22% 0,91 0 0%*** 0 0%** 0 0%* 0,75 2,42% 0 0% 0 0%23 
Germany Kohl III  2 22,2% 0,62 12 100% 4 100% 99 56,3% 0,5 0,8%* 0 0%* not in parliament 
Germany Kohl IV  5 17,5% 0,70 26,4 98,3% 20,6 44,9% 63 26,3% 0,2 0,6%* 0,4 0,2%* not in parliament 
Germany Schröder I  15 7,83% 0,86 30,9 99% 1,93 4,5%* 2,1 0,8%* 3,5 0,1% 7,1 3,3% not in parliament 
Germany Schröder 
II 
 16 3,0% 0,95 2 100% 0,6 1,2%* 0,1 0%* 8,8 20,8% 5,3 2,5% not in parliament 
Germany Schröder 
III 
 32 12,8% 0,78 43,3 92,2% 7,5 15,6% 9,7 4,7* 7,8 13,9% 2,7 1,3* not in parliament 
Germany Merkel I  38 17,8% 0,69 63,7 99% 11,3 18% 24,8 18,9% 0,5 0,5%* 0,7 0,3%* not in parliament 
Germany Merkel II  40 13,6% 0,77 12 100% 4 100% 99 56,3% 0,5 0,8%* 0 0%* not in parliament 
Germany Merkel III  2 22,2% 0,62 56,5 99,2% 16,4 28,3% 6,5 5,6%* not in parliament 0,2 0,1%* not in parliament 
Spain Zapatero I  1 2,06% 0,96 2 100% not in parliament 1* 0,6%* not in parliament 1 0,82% not in parliament 
Spain Zapatero 
II 
 
3 
0,30% 0,98 0,33 16,67% not in parliament 0* 0%* not in parliament 0 0% not in parliament 
Spain Rajoy   6 3,06% 0,92 6 66,67% not in parliament 0 0% not in parliament 0,2* 0,10%* not in parliament 
UK Blair  1 26,56% 0,6 not in parliament not in parliament 84 24,85%* 52 100% 2 1,35% not in parliament 
UK Cameron I  4 16,34% 0,76 not in parliament 1 100% 65,75 35,05% 3,25 8,53%* 9,5 3,49%* not in parliament 
UK Cameron 
II 
 1 35,97% 0,46 not in parliament 1 100% 153 69,86% 2 25% 7 2,17%* 0 0% 
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Figure 1: Boxplot of party families’ support for peace and security missions 
  
 
 
PRG = Parti radical de gauche (France); EER = Erakond Eestimaa ohelised (Estonia); ER = Eesti Reformierakond 
(Estonia);  V = Venstre (Denmark) NEOS = Das neue Österreich (Austria); RP = Twój Ruch (Poland); RZS = Red, 
zakonnost i spravedlivost (Bulgaria); KNP = Kongres Nowej Prawicy (Poland); NFSB = Natsionalen Front za 
Spasenie na Bulgaria (Bulgaria); VMRO-BND = VMRO—Bulgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie (Bulgaria) 
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Figure 2: Average share of no-votes across party families in the four countries under study 
 
 
IU = Izquierda Unida (Spain); fr. RadL = Parti communiste français (PCF) and Parti radical de gauche (PRG) 
combined;  LibDem = Liberal Democrats (UK), 
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Figure 3: Comparison of average share of no-votes between parties in government and 
parties in opposition in the four countries under study 
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Figure 4: Mapping of political parties’ positions on military missions and on a left/right-
scale, 2014 
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Figure 5: Mapping of political parties’ positions on military missions and on a GAL/TAN-
scale, 2014 
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Figure 6: Mapping of political parties’ positions on a left/right-scale and share of no-votes 
in parliamentary deployment votes24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 We attribute 2010 CHES scores for left/right (figure 6) and GAL/TAN (figure 7) to the legislative terms of 
Merkel II (2009-2013), Zapatero II (2008-2011), Sarkozy (2007-2012) and the British House of Commons votes in 
the period 2010-2013. 2014 CHES scores are attributed to Merkel III (2013-2017), Rajoy I (2011-2015), Holland 
(2012-2017) and the House of Commons votes in 2014 and 2015. Christian Democrats in Germany, Liberals and 
Radical Left in France consisted of two or more political parties whose CHES scores were then weighted according 
to their share of seats in parliament.  
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Figure 7: Mapping of political parties’ positions on a GAL/TAN-scale and share of no-votes 
in parliamentary deployment votes 
 
 
 
 
